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COUGHLIN'S COMPLAINT: HOW TO DISPARAGE
OUTSIDER WRITING, ONE YEAR LATER
Richard Delgado*
INTRODUCTION
AUTOBIOGRAPHY can be engrossing, sobering, poignant, even
Pinspiring. Professor Derrick Bell's recent Confronting Author-
ity,1 for example, is all of these. Autobiography can also be edify-
ing-recent scholarship teaches that "one cannot begin to understand
the situation of others until one also understands one's differences
from them and how this difference affects one's ways of seeing the
world." 2 In particular, reading the autobiographies of contemporary
African-Americans and other writers of color can provide unique
insights into the way racism works and can enable the reader to see
the world through another's eyes.3
In Regulating the Self. Autobiographical Performances in Outsider
Scholarship,4 Professor Anne Coughlin finds little good to say about
this genre of legal writing. Her article is almost wholly negative.
Whenever a generous or ungenerous interpretation is equally
possible, she unfailingly chooses the latter, often rearranging the
evidence to suit her dire conclusion. Reasoning largely on the basis
of literary theory, specifically the notion that autobiography cannot
afford the writer the opportunity to escape the sway of cultural
bonds, she looks for, and professes to find, evidence of that failure
in the writing of three critical race scholars and one well-known
white feminist. Each of these writers attempts to transcend liberal
*Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., University
of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1974.
1 Derrick Bell, Confronting Authority: Reflections of an Ardent Protester (1994)
(recounting author's career as first tenured black professor at Harvard Law School).
2 J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 Yale L.J.
1935, 1952 (1995) (reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free
Speech (1993)).
3 See, e.g., Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989) (containing
articles by Toni M. Massaro, Patricia Williams, Steven L. Winter, Milner S. Ball, Mari J.
Matsuda, Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and others).
4 Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider
Scholarship, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229 (1995).
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individualism, but instead, according to Coughlin, ends up replaying
banal plots: one is a scarlet lady;5 another a self-important Horatio
Alger;6 a third rearranges his past to appear more heroic than he is; 7
and a fourth is a borrower of metaphors and manipulator who
violates a sacred covenant with her readers.8
Coughin's article lacks self-suspicion, balance, and humility.
Unlike critics such as Professors Dan Farber9 or Ed Rubin,10 who
acknowledge the benefits of critical race scholarship and research,
Coughlin presents a picture of disingenuous scholars who lie, play
to the crowd, pretend to be radicals, and make money at the expense
of scholarly ideals such as the Truth. In this reply article, I first
examine the interplay between Professor Coughlin's theory of
autobiography and her conclusions with respect to outsider scholar-
ship in general. I then examine her treatment of my writing in
particular. Finally, I offer a few words of caution and advice for
white feminists who study writers of color.
I. AUTOBIOGRAPHY'S AILMENTS: ON THE DANGERS OF
REASONING FROM THEORY
Anne Coughlin puts forward the pessimistic view that narrative
scholarship (which she generally equates with autobiography) is
doomed to be deeply conventional." Even when attempting to
challenge orthodoxy and open new vistas into racial and sexual
justice, the new narrativists unintentionally and ineluctably end up
replicating current social arrangements and reinscribing existing
meanings and plots.' 2 The writer's self is a construct, the product of
his or her interaction with society, a reflection of the ideas, mean-
5 Id. at 1322-38 (analyzing the writing of Robin West).
6 Id. at 1292-1302 (analyzing the writing of Jerome Culp).
7 Id. at 1312-21 (analyzing the writing of this author).
s Id. at 1302-12 (analyzing the writing of Patricia Williams).
9 Compare Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807 (1993) (criticizing critical race theory) with
Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 893
(1994) (praising critical race theory).
10 Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80
Cal. L. Rev. 889 (1992).
11 E.g., Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1232, 1241, 1251, 1252-84, 1285, 1334-35. We
should, however, be magnanimous enough to accept her scathing, and often personal, attack
in good grace. See id. at 1233.
12 E.g., id. at 1232, 1252, 1284-85, 1321.
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ings, and range of possibilities he or she finds there. 13 Autobiogra-
phers, moreover, focus on this very self, further limiting the
possibilities for transformative breakthroughs.14  Any type of
improvement in the condition of women and minorities of color will
require collective action, while autobiography, by its very nature,
causes the writer to become mired in liberal individualism, which
exalts and celebrates the self and its solitary struggles.15
Reasoning a priori and citing mainly literary theorists who write,
by and large, about white writers, 16 Coughlin concludes that
autobiography is a poor vehicle for insurrectionist scholarship. In
doing so Professor Coughlin (i) fails to ask whether there might be
something different about outsider scholarship that renders her theory
inaccurate when applied to it, (ii) fails to search carefully for
evidence that might refute her theory as applied to this body of
writing, and (iii) fails to ask the "compared-to-what" question about
the scholarship she ends up giving such low ratings. Consider the
latter question first. Autobiographers, like all writers, must use
words. Words, such as "woman," "African-American," "equal,"
and "reform," come fraught with pre-established meanings.17
English sentences have a structure, including, in most cases, a
subject and a predicate, thereby reinforcing a certain view of reality
and social relations.' 8 Finally, all texts end up being interpreted by
a reader, who will bring to them a background of pre-existing
stories, experiences, meanings, and plots that he or she recognizes
and has learned to apply.19
All this makes telling a transformative story of any sort-whether
about the self or anything else-difficult. Yet narrative, first-person
'3 Id. at 1235, 1253-54, 1284-87, 1292-94.
14 Id. at 1284-1335 (on the autobiographical self).
is Id. at 1232, 1247, 1284, 1292, 1320 (autobiography exalts self and its stories or petty
misfortunes).
16 E.g., id. at 1242 n. 37; 1254-56 no. 84-90, 93-94; 1261 nn. 115-17; 1269-75 nn. 145-
148, 150-151, 156-159, 164, 172; 1282 n. 197; 1285 nn. 209-210 (citing Hayden White,
Albert E. Stone, and Philippe Lejeune).
17 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258
(1992) (addressing the difficulty of using speech to challenge deep-seated stereotypes and
stories).
18 Viz., that the world consists of events that happen to things; that society consists of
separate individuals who act on each other.
'9 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 17, at 1261, 1280-82 (coining term "empathic
fallacy" to describe belief that this background can be easily transcended).
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writing has, at times, challenged authority directly and effectively.
Consider, for example, the Declaration of Independence ("We hold
these truths to be self-evident. . . . ")20 or the Bible ("Verily I say
unto thee . . -).21 To be sure, autobiography has also served
scoundrels and crooked politicians, who use it to defend themselves
and their sorry records. Autobiography can be used for good or ill.
A better question for Professor Coughlin to have asked, then, would
have been what other mode of discourse would better suit the radical
objectives of the critical race scholars.
This, in turn, raises two additional questions: Why do we use
autobiography? And why does Coughlin dislike it so much when we
do? In response to the second question, she offers hints: Autobiogra-
phy is remunerative. 22 But that is hardly the answer to the first-
autobiography is much less remunerative than litigation, for example,
or Hollywood script-writing. My Imperial Scholar article almost
certainly cost me many more professional opportunities than it
brought.23 Critical race scholars employ narrative and first-person
storytelling because it provides an outlet for double
consciousness24-the ability many outsiders have of seeing everything
in two ways at once-and through that, social criticism. This
double-sightedness inclines us toward a postmodern view that
embraces tension and duality.2 s The bearer of a stigma, such as a
black, gay, or latino, becomes accustomed to seeing himself as
others see him-that is, as despised and an object of scorn or pity.
20 The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
21 See, e.g., Matthew 5:26 (King James). Sometimes the familiar "verily" passages of
the King James Bible are reported speech: A narrator, usually Matthew, Mark, Luke, or
John, is telling Jesus' story. The first person is also used in the Epistles and John's
Revelation. See, e.g., Hebrews 2:12; Revelation 3: 13-14.
22 E.g., Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1232, 1282-83.
23 The article, Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984), criticizes mainstream civil rights scholars
for ignoring minority writing. Although some may have responded constructively, I suspect
others took offense, perhaps retaliating against me at key points in my career.
24 On double consciousness, see W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folks 1-12 (Johnson
Reprint Corp. 1968) (1903); Ralph Ellison, The Invisible Man 1-14 (Random House 1992)
(1947).
25 For the view that this perspective affords the outsider scholar an advantage in Critical
Race writing and analysis, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 Yale L.J. 1357
(1992). Earlier, it permitted slaves to talk or sing in a sort of code, so that the masters (if
they overheard) would hear one thing, while fellow slaves heard something different. Is it
possible that Coughlin misses this dual-meaning element of some outsider writing?
[Vol. 82:95
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At the same time, he sees himself as normal. 26 Autobiography is a
consummate vehicle for portraying this form of double experience;
it lends outsider writing the edge that many have found instructive
and fascinating. And it assists the cause of social transformation
because it helps majority-race readers understand how they are both
different from us and the same. It helps them acquire the sort of
multiple consciousness that comes to us all too easily-and which is
the necessary precondition of any form of social healing.
But convinced that there is no excuse for all the autobiography that
is going on, Coughlin deploys a massive and highly condemnatory
theory, a huge edifice resting on slender facts and even slenderer
sins, to find outsider narratives trite and unhelpful. As always, the
devil is in the details. Her plausible-sounding theory can be made
to seem true only by selective reporting and highly strained (and
invariably unflattering) interpretations of her evidence. In Professor
Robin West's case, for example, Coughlin combs a very large body
of writing to find a single article in which the writer describes, with
considerable restraint, her own sexual experience.27 Coughlin then
concludes that autobiographical writing predisposes one toward self-
display.28 Indeed, Professor West's delicacy and sense of tact are
used against her; since all the action takes place offstage, the reader
is left to guess at the details. Thus, through Coughlin's manipula-
tion, the author emerges as a tease. 29 Professor Culp tells how he
often begins his classes by explaining to his students his social
origins: He is the son of a poor coal miner. 30 Culp may employ this
technique for a variety of reasons, including a desire to inform his
students who he is; the wish to let them know that poor, black people
are not unintelligent or devoid of ambition; or simply to let them
know in advance what his perspective in teaching the materials will
be. So far as I have been able to tell, this brief reference to his
social origins is one of the few times in his impressive body of
26 See DuBois, supra note 24; Ellison, supra note 24.
27 Coughlin discusses Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of FeministLegal Theory, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. 81 (1987). See
Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1322.
28 See, e.g., Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1232 (celebrates the self, makes suffering a
market commodity); id. at 1247 (exaggerated claims "cause for wonder"); id. at 1284 (tends
to the "heroic"); id. at 1320 (misdirected heroism).
29 See id. at 1322-38.
30 See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching:
Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 Va. L. Rev. 539, 539 (1991).
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writing that Culp says much about his early life. Yet, Coughlin
seizes upon this passage to label Culp a boasting "Horatio Alger"
type-and generalizes to find self-glorification an inherent danger in
the autobiographical mode for outsider scholars. 31
It is as though a zoologist from another planet, wanting to
determine whether birds can fly, looked for times when they were
nesting, feeding on the ground, or sleeping, and pronounced them
non-flyers. At times, Coughlin does not even have evidence of the
sort she needs on hand, so she straightforwardly makes it up, as I
shall discuss later in my own case. The fact is, we have outsider
scholars to thank for a host of ideas and perspectives. The reader is
invited to consult my recent annotated bibliographies of critical race
theory writing32 for a sample, including the critique of neutrality and
color-blindness in the law;33 whiteness as a property interest;34
3' See Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1292 (finding that Culp's story "duplicate[s] . ..the
rags-to-riches stories popularized by Horatio Alger"). In another case, Professor Coughlin
simply changes the author's text to make it come out the way she wants. Consider her
attempt to establish that I, like Culp, engage in the autobiographer's sin of self-impor-
tance-of demanding inexcusably (like Horatio Alger) to be accepted where one is not
welcome or has earned the right to entry. Id. at 1258 & n.106. In my second Imperial
Scholar article, I asked a question as a way of framing the ensuing discussion:
What happens when a group of insurgent scholars gains admission, gets inside the
door... ? Are these new scholars promptly granted equal standing, integrated fully
into the conversations, colloquies, footnotes, and exchanges that constitute legal-
academic discourse on issues of race and equality? Or, are they still marginalized,
muffled, and kept in limbo-to be seen, perhaps, but not heard?
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing,
Ten Years Later, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 1350 (1992) (emphasis added).
Scarcely a strident passage--especially when one considers that my answer to the question
turns out to be no. See id. at 1372 (concluding that new scholars are "not being integrated
fully or easily into the colloquies, exchanges, and dialogues of legal scholarship").
In her note, however, Coughlin changes the underlined passage by dropping the question
mark and adding the words "should be." The passage is converted into a provocative piece
of self-assertion: Delgado says minority scholars "should "promptly [be] granted equal
standing 'and 'integrated fully into' activities pursued by mainstream scholars[.] " Coughlin,
supra note 4, at 1258 n.106 (emphasis added).
Coughlin's critique is full of liberties taken, like this one, to make the author look
demanding or self-important.
32 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography,
79 Va. L. Rev. 461 (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory, An
Annotated Bibliography: 1993: A Year of Transition, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 159 (1995). See
also Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (collecting essays
in CRT corpus).
33 See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 Stan L. Rev.
1 (1991).
34 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993).
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Western ideology and its role in the conquest of Indian lands;35
reasoning from the bottom; 36 the development of anti-hate speech
doctrine; 37 the critique of intent in antidiscrimination law and the role
of unconscious racism;38 the notion of intersectionality and anti-
essentialism; 39 the social construction of race (including the white
race);40 the notion of civil rights as a homeostatic, interest-serving
device;41 the Constitution as an instrument of white supremacy; 42 and
many other themes. Coughlin gives us credit for none of these, even
though many derive from legal storytelling or narrative analy-
sis-what she calls "autobiography." She is too busy proving that
birds can't fly to look around for evidence to the contrary.
And what are the principal sins of Coughlin's condemned? We
sometimes earn royalties and speaker's fees. 43 Robin West once
wrote about sex. 44 Patricia Williams wrote irritably to some editors
who wanted proof of racist intent in a slight the author suffered at a
clothing store. 45 (But, of course, her point was that if she had
written that the United States is the best, fairest country in the world
with untold opportunities for minorities, the editors would have
allowed the passage to slip through unfootnoted.) Autobiography
silences dissent and criticism, for no one can attack it without
seeming to put the writer's life and personhood on the line. 46 (But
35 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31
Ariz. L. Rev. 237 (1989).
36 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987).
37 See Marl J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, I, Richard Delgado, & Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the
First Amendment (1993).
38 See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
39 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 581 (1990).
40 See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
41 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980).
42 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism, and American Law 1-52 (3d ed. 1993).
43 Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1232, 1282-84, 1287.
44 See id. at 1322-88, analyzing West, supra note 27.
45 See Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1273-74, 1282.
46 See id. at 1234, 1281-82.
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this certainly has not stopped Coughlin, nor Mark Tushnet, 47 nor
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry 48 ). First-person narratives incline
one toward plagiarism (or at least the sin of unacknowledged
borrowing), since the writer, being caught up in her own experi-
ences, say with a sausage-making machine metaphor for legal
process,49 can ignore that Bismarck or Disraeli also wrote about
sausage-makers a century or more ago.5 0 (Of course, Williams'
point was not to reiterate Disraeli's; he was not writing about jury
dynamics at all but using the metaphor for quite another purpose.)
Finally, first-person writing predisposes the author to ignore group
history, with its suffering and poverty, in favor of preoccupation
with the middle-class self and its laments.5 1 (But see any critical
race theory writer or article for evidence to the contrary).
II. MY OwN CASE: DELGADO, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHER
Coughlin's treatment of me illustrates her theory-driven approach
and inattention to actual evidence. Consider her characterization of
me as an autobiographer at all,52 and then her treatment of the "wiser
counsel" incident described in my first Imperial Scholar article. 53
A. Who Me? Autobiographer? (Compared to What?)
First, one who is familiar with my scholarship might ask, "why is
Delgado considered an autobiographer at all?" Evidently, when
Coughlin presented her paper at faculty workshops, this point created
consternation-Delgado a writer of autobiography? Several listeners
challenged the characterization, as well they should. The word "I"
appears infrequently in my writing, mainly in the mandatory "maps"
most law review editors want to see (e.g., "In the first section of this
article, I . . . . "). Even the most diligent reader of my more than
100 law review articles does NOT learn the answers to ANY of the
47 Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 Geo. L.J. 251 (1992).
48 Farber & Sherry, supra note 9.
49 Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1287-88.
50 Id. at 1288-90 (questioning Professor William's failure to credit these earlier
authors-but also neglecting to cite liberal novelist Upton Sinclair's work on the meat-
packing industry).
5' See id. at 1283-87, 1291-92.
52 See id. at 1313 ("[tlhe autobiographical essays authored by Richard Delgado"); id. at
1315 ("Delgado's autobiographical narrative").
5 Delgado, supra note 23.
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common questions one finds addressed in autobiography. For
example, the reader might test himself or herself: Does he or she
know where I was bom? Who my parents are? How many siblings
I have? Where I grew up? My height, weight, or age? My
ethnicity? Appearance? Sexual orientation? Marital status?
Whether I have children, and if so, how many? What I did before
going to law school? Who my professors or role models were?
What law school classes I teach? Where I live? With whom?
Whether I have any disabilities? Grew up rich or poor? Speak any
foreign languages? Whether I have had any adventures or great
loves? Travelled in any foreign countries? Have any hobbies, pets,
avocations, or play a musical instrument? Whether I practiced law,
and if so, what kind and what I thought of it? In short, the reader
does not learn, from my writing, anything significant about me as a
person. Yet Coughlin seizes upon a single anecdote from one work
and proclaims me an autobiographer.
I do tell stories, however. I am the author of an earlier piece
(which Coughlin cites) on storytelling in the law, in which I recount
five versions of the same event.5 4 I am also the author of a series,
entitled The Rodrigo Chronicles,55 including one that appeared in this
law review.5 6 But Rodrigo and his interlocutor are completely fic-
tional characters. The Chronicles dissect various vices and
shortcomings of American culture and justice. They focus not on my
own life as author, nor even very much on fictional characters, like
"Giannina" or Rodrigo's faculty advisor. They are about events and
characters (such as judges) in the real world. The Chronicles are the
antithesis of autobiography.
It is essential that Professor Coughlin find that I am an autobiogra-
pher, however, for otherwise her theory would not hold true. An
early misstep (as she considers it) could not be laid at the doorstep
of autobiography, nor operate together with her critique of Williams,
54Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2411, 2418-35 (1989).
5 See Richard Delgado, The Rodrigo Chronicles (1995) (collecting eight earlier
chronicles, featuring an older professor and his alter ego Rodrigo Crenshaw, which
appeared in various law reviews); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Ninth Chronicle: Race, Legal
Instrumentalism, and the Rule of Law, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379 (1994); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 Geo. L.J. 1711 (1995).
56 Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears-On the
Social Construction of Threat, 80 Va. L. Rev. 503 (1994).
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Culp, and West to support a theory of autobiography's pitfalls and
shortcomings. Let us see, then, what she makes of the passage she
focuses on from The Imperial Scholar.
B. The Imperial Scholar and the "Wiser Counsel" Incident as
Constructed by Professor Coughlin's Imagination
On the first page of my 1984 article, The Imperial Scholar.
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, I mention that
certain senior colleagues had warned me, early in my career, against
writing in the field of civil rights.5 7 I described this incident, which
in different variations many women and scholars of color likewise
report, in order to explain how I happened to be reading a great deal
of civil rights literature all at once, several years into my teaching
career. The article, written a short time after I received tenure,
analyzes citation practices in the field of civil rights.
Rather than investigate what happened-I would have been glad to
cooperate-Professor Coughlin concludes that it could not have
happened the way I described it.58 And what is her reason for
believing I fabricated the "wiser counsel" incident?: the existence of
two law review articles, published during my first year of teaching
and cited in The Imperial Scholar itself,59 the first dealing with
whether Mexican-Americans can be a legally cognizable class, 60 and
the second on legal education of minority students. 61
Professor Coughlin seizes on these two articles, proclaims them
civil rights pieces, and uses them to discredit my statement about
having been warned away from civil rights writing early in my
career. The result is that I acted disreputably no matter when I
wrote the articles. If I had already written about civil rights, I could
not have been warned away from the subject; or, if the warning was
successful, my acquiescence showed cowardice and a willingness to
57 See Delgado, supra note 23, at 561.
58 Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1319-20. To her credit, Professor Coughlin did send me a
copy of her article. But this occurred on the eve of its publication and long after she had
presented it at workshops at many law schools-in short, after much of the harm was done.
59 Delgado, supra note 23, at 572 n.60, 574 n.65.
60 Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican-Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class
Under Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 Notre Dame Law. 393 (1975).
61 Leo M. Romero, Richard Delgado, & Cruz Reynoso, The Legal Education of Chicano
Students: A Study in Mutual Accommodation and Cultural Conflict, 5 N.M. L. Rev. 177
(1975).
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put career above social concerns. All this is designed to show that
the autobiographical vehicle inclines the author to fabricate facts
about his or her career to make himself appear more heroic or
victimized than he really was. 62
But do the two articles really establish what Coughlin thinks they
do? Not at all. I wrote the two articles in question, as Professor
Coughlin could easily have ascertained, during a Council on Legal
Education Opportunity summer institute for minority law school
applicants held at the University of New Mexico the summer
following my graduation from Boalt Hall and just before I entered
full-time law teaching at Arizona State University in August, 1974.
My teaching duties at the institute turned out to be relatively light,
and finding myself with some time on my hands and surrounded by
a number of minority colleagues, I proposed that we start two
articles. That is how I happened to write the piece with Leo Romero
and Cruz Reynoso, 63 both of whom were professors at New Mexico.
It is also how I happened to start the second article, co-authored with
Vicky Palacios, 64 now a law professor but then a teaching assistant
at the same institute.
At the end of the summer, I showed up at my first duty station,
Arizona State, and a little later arrived at my second, the University
of Washington, where I received essentially the same warnings from
well-meaning senior professors: Go easy on the ethnic stuff,
Delgado, until after you have tenure. I then produced a steady
stream-thirteen articles in a row-on non-civil rights subjects, spe-
cifically, law and medicine. 6s All of this is a matter of public
record. Anyone, including Anne Coughlin, with an interest in my
early publication history can walk into a library and look up the
entries for "Delgado" in the Index to Legal Periodicals for the years
in question. (Indeed, to make the reader's, and Professor Cough-
lin's, task a little easier, I have attached the first page of the list of
publications from my curriculum vitae, with nothing omitted, in
Appendix I of this reply article.) The "wiser counsel" incident
happened just as I said it did, the sequence being something
Professor Coughlin could easily have checked before labeling me a
62 See Coughlin, supra note 4, at 91, 1320-21.
63 Romero et al., supra note 61.
64 Delgado & Palacios, supra note 60.
65 See Appendix I, infra.
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fabricator and a liar. As to her charge of cowardice in my acceding
to the wiser counsel warning, I can only conclude that she must be
woefully ignorant of the conditions under which minority scholars
labored in the mid-1970s and still often do today. Her accusation
that I then turned this warning around on my counselors, telling them
to get out and stay out of civil rights, is a black and white reading
of a gray proposition. Rather, I politely asked that they not make
careers out of the field; occasional proposals or articles are still quite
welcome. 66 The cure for the ignorance Coughlin betrays is exactly
the sort of reading (autobiography) she condemns so sweepingly.
Why does an intelligent scholar like Coughlin commit the blunders
she does? I believe the reason is simply her antipathy to the
substance of critical race scholarship and radical feminism.
Conservative scholar Stephen Carter, for example, is much more
autobiographical than I. He writes about his upbringing, 67 his
professor father, 68 his achievement test scores, 69 his experiences with
high school cliques, 70 and his early years in law. 71 He also commit-
ted a misrepresentation so serious regarding a conflict with the
National Merit Scholarship Corporation that he later felt compelled
to issue a retraction.72 Would not the mistakes and dangers of
autobiographical writing be more readily explored in the body of
work of a conservative scholar such as Carter? Or, take Clarence
Thomas, who portrayed in great detail his Horatio Alger upbringing,
relations with his sister, and efforts to achieve success and dignity in
the legal world.73 Would not his own stories vis-A-vis his sister and
his employee, Anita Hill, have supplied even more intriguing grist
for analysis than those of Culp, Williams, West, and myself?
66See Delgado, supra note 23, at 577. ("But while no one could object if sensitive white
scholars contribute occasional articles and useful proposals. . . must [they] make a career
of it?").
67 See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby 73, 76-77, 78-79
(1991).
68 Id. at 47.
69 Id. at 48.
70 Id. at 47-48.
71 Id. at 58-59.
7 Stephen L. Carter, 'Best Black' Syndrome: My Bitter Memory; Somehow, for 20
Years, I Was Haunted by a Slight That Never Happened, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1991, at C5.
73For descriptions and analyses of the proceedings that led to Thomas's confirmation, see
Symposium, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import
of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1279 (1992); Jane Mayer
& Jill Abramson, Strange Justice: The Selling of Clarence Thomas 31-61 (1994).
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Coughlin's critique is a patchwork of uncharitable characterizations,
imputations of motive, and outright misrepresentations of fact. A
group of scholars intent only on working for racial and sexual justice
in a world that sadly lacks it deserves better. Toward the end of her
article, Professor Coughlin says the four of us would do better to
address the plight of society's poor and dispossessed.74 But, as a
member of the "tough-love" school, there is little in her own writing
to suggest she would approve of this writing if she saw or could even
recognize it. Her most recent work criticizes the battered woman
syndrome defense for depicting women as irrational and lacking self-
control. 75 Coughlin is the opposite of an autobiographer. She is a
scold, who writes in finger-wagging fashion in the voice of the social
"we": moralistic, high-handed, and full of vague suggestions that
"you could do better."
In Beloved, one of the slave owners writes a ruthlessly reductive
"scientific" account of the behavior of his slaves. According to
Sethe, the novel's central character, "this book about us" was one
of the worst atrocities committed against the slaves on her planta-
tion. It now seems to me that any white scholar writing about a
work by a black writer may come perilously close to this same
offense. We take a powerful and brilliantly rich text set within a
history of racial oppression that implicates us all, and we organize
it, master it, impose upon it a language and perspective utterly
foreign to the culture from which it issued. No matter how good
our intentions, how knowledgeable we may be about African-
American literary theory, I do not believe it is possible for white
critics simply to leave their perspective, growing out of their white
privilege, at the door when entering these texts.76
Despite her professed intentions only to help, Professor Coughlin
strikes me as coming close to replicating the sin of the slave master
described so starkly above in her mistaken analysis of the autobio-
graphical efforts of critical race scholars.
74 See Coughlin, supra note 4, at 1340.
75 See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
76 Katherine J. Mayberry, White Feminists Who Study Black Writers, Chron. Higher
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